Payment to a fraudulent IBAN: the debtor remains liable

A debtor who transfers the price to fraudulent bank details does not discharge its debt. A third party who assumes the creditor's identity is not an apparent creditor (créancier apparent) within the meaning of Article 1342-3 of the French Civil Code: the payer's good faith is then not enough to make the payment valid. The unpaid supplier may therefore claim the price a second time.

Key points

• Article 1342-3 of the French Civil Code validates payment made in good faith to an apparent creditor.
• A third party who assumes the creditor's identity is not an apparent creditor: a transfer received into its account does not discharge the debtor.
• A buyer who knows its supplier's identity and transfers the price to fraudulent bank details remains liable to pay the invoice.
• The involvement of an intermediary that passed on the false invoice and the false bank account details does not make that payment valid.
• The unpaid supplier may claim the price from its customer and may also seek to establish the intermediary's liability.

A fuel invoice paid into a fraudster's account

The commercial chamber quashes the court of appeal's decision: the transfer made to a fraudster posing as the supplier did not extinguish the debt (Com., 17 June 2026, No. 24-13.306). A diesel supplier had sold fuel, through a company established in Italy, to a foreign buyer, in order to supply a vessel calling at a French port. The intermediary received an email sent from an address differing by only one letter from the supplier's genuine address, together with the invoice and bank account details.

The intermediary passed the invoice and the bank account details on to the buyer, which transferred the sum claimed to the account indicated. That account belonged to a fraudster and the funds could not be recovered. The supplier brought proceedings against the buyer for payment of the price and, in the alternative, against the intermediary for damages. The court of appeal (CA Aix en Provence, 21 December 2023, No. 20/07539) held that the payment had discharged the debt and dismissed both claims.

The commercial chamber relies on Article 1342-3 of the French Civil Code, under which payment made in good faith to an apparent creditor is valid. It sets the limits of that provision in a brief statement (free translation):

A third party who assumes the creditor's identity is not an apparent creditor within the meaning of that provision.

The buyer knew that its creditor was the supplier. It therefore did not pay an apparent creditor, but a person fraudulently posing as the supplier. The quashing extends to all the provisions of the decision, including the dismissal of the alternative claim directed against the intermediary, and the case is remitted to the court of appeal in Lyon.

Who bears the loss of a transfer made to fraudulent bank details?

A debtor that has transferred the funds to a fraudster's account remains, in principle, liable to pay its creditor. The apparent creditor exception protects a party that has been mistaken as to the identity of the creditor itself, for instance faced with an apparent heir or a disputed assignee of a claim. It does not protect a party that correctly identifies its creditor but sends the funds to falsified bank details. The payer's good faith, on its own, does not turn a diverted transfer into a valid payment.

The economic consequence is direct: the loss falls first on the business that carried out the transfer. It retains the possibility of pursuing the perpetrator of the fraud, a remedy that is often illusory once the funds have disappeared. The decision settles neither the liability of the intermediary that relayed the false invoice, nor that of the banks. Those questions fall under other bases, in particular liability for fault, the conditions of which must be established separately.

Apparent creditor: what the decision confirms and leaves open

The decision discussed here closes off, for the victims of identity fraud, the argument based on the apparent creditor. Delivered by the chamber sitting in plenary session, it lays down a general rule, applicable to all frauds involving fraudulent bank details or a purported change of bank details. As the case law stands at 17 June 2026, a debtor may no longer argue that its transfer is valid on the sole ground that it was unaware of the substitution of the bank account.

The court of appeal had noted that the buyer had never been in direct contact with the supplier and could not detect the anomaly in the bank references passed on to it. Those findings, favourable to the payer, were not enough. The question of fault remains entirely open: the remittal to the court of appeal in Lyon reopens the examination of the claim for payment and of the alternative claim brought against the intermediary.

What precautions before carrying out a supplier transfer?

Any request for payment accompanied by new bank details calls for verification through a channel independent of the email received. A call to the number appearing in the contract or on earlier invoices, and not to the one given in the message, remains the simplest check. Comparing the sender's email address character by character makes it possible to spot the letter that has been added or removed. Vigilance is also required where the payment order passes through a commercial intermediary.

On the contractual side, general terms and framework agreements may set up a procedure for validating changes of bank details: internal dual signature, written confirmation from the supplier, waiting period before execution. On the creditor's side, discovering a fraud does not justify abandoning recovery: the debt survives as long as the payment has not reached the person entitled to it. Keeping emails, their headers and exchanges with the intermediary prepares the way for proving the respective faults.

The checks to carry out before paying an invoice

• Confirm any new bank account details with a contact already known, by telephone, before ordering the transfer.
• Check the sender's full email address, and not only the displayed name.
• Set out an internal procedure for changing supplier bank details, applying also to orders passed on by an intermediary.
• As creditor, chase the debtor: a transfer that has reached a fraudster does not amount to payment.
• Archive emails, invoices and transfer confirmations, which will serve to establish where liability lies.